Jan Narveson criticizes the view expressed in my Libertarian Philosophy in the Real World that there is no orthodox libertarian position on the ethics of abortion. He asserts that fetuses lack the defining characteristics of personhood, and thus are ineligible for what he terms “intrinsic” rights under his, and presumably any other, plausible libertarian theory. My counterargument is threefold: Narveson’s contractarianism can be interpreted in a way that is consistent with the pro-life perspective; because his theory permits no principled distinction (...) between the moral status of third trimester fetuses and newborns, the contrary reading of his social contract produces a result that is implausible and even repellent; and even if his version of contractarianism does imply a unique, aggressively pro-choice stance on abortion, there are competing libertarian theories that are receptive to pro-life views. (shrink)

Contemporary liberal theorists generally support open borders and some argue that liberalism is incompatible with substantive immigration control. We argue that it has not been shown that there is an inconsistency in the idea of a liberal state enforcing such controls and that it may be obligatory for a liberal state to impose substantive restrictions on immigration. The immigration control on which we focus is that concerning people from societies that resemble closed societies, particularly those in which Islamic fundamentalism is (...) endemic. We suggest that, if the threat we envision is real, then a liberal state has a right to limit immigration from such societies. (shrink)

Review of Mark Friedman's book 'Nozick’s Libertarian Project,' which is a defence of Robert Nozick's 'Anarchy, State, and Utopia.'.

Is it rational to strive for the unattainable? In this short and provocative study, Nicholas Rescher vigorously defends both the rationality and practicality of seriously pursuing impossible dreams.

The rapid, recent emergence of new medical knowledge models has engendered a dizzying number of new medical initiatives, programs and approaches. Fields such as evidence-based medicine and translational medicine all promise a renewed relationship between knowledge and medicine. The question for philosophy and other fields has been whether these new models actually achieve their promises to bring about better kinds of medical knowledge—a question that compels scholars to analyze each model’s epistemic claims. Yet, these analyses may miss critical components that (...) explain how these models actually work and function. Using the case of translational medicine, this paper suggests that analyses which treat these models as a primarily epistemic interventions miss the way that new approaches are increasingly shaped by specific financial and commercial agendas. Ultimately, social epistemological analyses that are attentive to market forces are required to make sense of emerging bioscientific research models, which are increasingly tethered to or a manifestation of increasingly financialized models of science research and innovation. (shrink)

THERE are several answers in Aquinas to the question, what is the ground of the world's intelligibility. The fullest- answer is contained by the account of creation and expressed in the doctrine of divine Ideas. I would like to trace the lines of that doctrine in Aquinas's corpus as a means of showing how an account of creation at once clarifies and inverts the analysis of natural intelligibility.

We explore the consistency strength of Σ 3 1 and Σ 4 1 absoluteness, for a variety of forcing notions.

Prior research has studied the antecedents of beliefs regarding ethics and social responsibility (ESR). However, few studies have examined how individual well-being may be related to such beliefs. In this exploratory study, we assessed the relationship between perceived importance of ESR – both individually and of one's company – and indicators of physical and psychological well-being. Results demonstrated that perceived importance of ESR was associated with three aspects of well-being: exuberance for life, sleep problems, and job stress. The results are (...) discussed in terms of future directions for research, and the need for a conceptual framework connecting individual and organizational perceptions of ESR and outcomes of well-being. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Beyond the Ethics of Wealth and a World of Economic InequalityMark D. WoodAnalyzing the ethics of wealth and the relationship between the dominant ethics of wealth and economic inequality is vital to creating a humane mode of global life. We are living during a period in which the unequal concentration of wealth—which is to say, the unequal concentration of the resources that make human existence, development, and fulfillment possible—has (...) never been greater.1 The World Bank reports that almost “1.3 billion people remain below the extreme poverty line with an income of US $1.25 or less a day. Close to 2.5 billion—more than one-third of the world’s population—live on less than US $2 a day, another common measurement of deep deprivation,”2 and a staggering 80 percent of the world’s population struggles to survive on less than US $10 dollars a day.3 Credit Suisse’s 2012 Global Wealth Report indicates “the bottom half of the global population [or more than 3.5 billion persons] possess barely 1 percent of total wealth... In sharp contrast, the richest 10 percent own 86 percent of the world’s wealth, with the top 1 percent alone accounting for 46 percent of global assets.”4 Given the history of international colonial and neocolonial relations, it comes as no surprise that wealth is highly concentrated in Western Europe and North America, while the overwhelming majority of individuals living in poverty are concentrated in Africa, India, Asia, and Central and South America.5The wealth gap between the top 10 percent and the bottom 90 percent is, however, also reaching record levels in developed nations. While in 2012, the United States had the seventh highest average wealth holdings per adult in the world, “among nations with at least a quarter-million adults, only Russia, Ukraine, and Lebanon are more unequal” than the United States.6 A Reuters investigative report published in 2012 reveals that “inequality has risen not just in plutocratic hubs such as Wall Street and Silicon Valley, but also in virtually every corner of the world’s richest nation: Inequality has increased in 49 of 50 states since 1989,” with Mississippi being the only exception, even as it still “ranks worst in the nation on both counts.”7 In 2010, “the top 1 percent of households (the upper class) owned 35.4 percent of all privately held wealth, and the next 19 percent (the managerial, professional, and small business stratum) had 53.5 percent, which means that just 20 percent of the people owned a remarkable 89 percent, leaving only 11 percent of the wealth for the bottom 80 percent [End Page 125] (wage and salary workers).”8 In The Price of Inequality (2012), Nobel Prize–winning economist Joseph E. Stiglitz indicates that the “six heirs to the Walmart empire command wealth of $69.7 billion dollars, which is equivalent to the entire wealth of the bottom 30 percent of U.S. society.”9 In short, six individuals possess more wealth than do ninety-six million individuals—though this figure is misleading inasmuch as most of the ninety-six million own almost nothing but mounting debt. Most significantly, the top 10 percent own between 81 percent and 94 percent of all stocks, bonds, trust funds, and business equity, and almost 80 percent of non-home real estate.10 G. William Domhoff makes the vital point that inasmuch as “financial wealth is what counts as far as the control of income-producing assets,” that is, control of the means of producing wealth, “we can say that just 10 percent of the people own the United States of America.”11 Meanwhile, according to the latest census, fifty million Americans qualify as poor and another 100 million qualify as low income.12The concentration of the lion’s share of wealth in the hands of a tiny fraction of humanity is devastating for the majority of people living on the planet and ultimately for everyone. On the ground, capitalism’s champagne glass–shaped distribution of wealth means that hundreds of millions of persons have barely enough of the basics necessary to exist. Between 24,000... (shrink)

An Argument From Evolutionary Naturalism An Argument from Personal Dignity References.

Arguments that Aquinas’s literal commentaries on Aristotle present his own philosophy are often proxies for larger claims about the relation of philosophy to theology. While trying to secure a place for Thomas in philosophic conversation, such arguments impose modern notions of an autonomous and apodictic philosophy, with fixed genres of declarative speech. The result is neither a plausiblereading of the Thomistic corpus nor a helpful exemplar for contemporary Catholic philosophy.

The for addiction proposed by Redish and colleagues is only unified at a reductionist level of analysis, the biological one relating to decision-making. Theories of addiction may be complementary rather than mutually exclusive, suggesting that limitations of individual theories might be unified through the combination of ideas from different biopsychosocial systems perspectives.

In "Behavioral Law and Economics: The Assault on Consent, Will, and Dignity," Mark D. White uses the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant to examine the intersection of economics, psychology, and law known as "behavioral law and economics." Scholars in this relatively new field claim that, because of various cognitive biases and failures, people often make choices that are not in their own interests. The policy implications of this are that public and private organizations, such as the state and employers, (...) can and should design the presentation of options and default choices in order to "steer" people to the decision they would make, were they able to make choices in the absence of their cognitive biases and failures. Such policies are promoted under the name "libertarian paternalism," because choice is not blocked or co-opted, but simply "nudged." White argues that such manipulation of choice is impossible to conduct in people's true interests, and any other goal pursed by policymakers substitutes their own ends, however benevolent they may be, for people's true ends. Normatively, such manipulation should not be conducted because it fails to respect the dignity and autonomy of persons, what some hold to be the central idea in Kant's ethical system, and which serves to protect the individual from coercion, however subtle, from other persons or the state. (shrink)

Clinical bioethics is big business. There are now hundreds of people who bioethics in community and university hospitals, nursing homes, rehabilitation and home care settings, and some who play the role of clinical ethics consultant to transplant teams, managed care companies, and genetic testing firms. Still, there is as much speculation about what clinically active bioethicists actually do as there was ten years ago. Various commentators have pondered the need for training standards, credentials, exams, and malpractice insurance for ethicists engaged (...) in clinical consultation. Much of the discussion seems to accept an implicit presumption that all clinical ethics consultation practices look pretty much alike. But is this accurate? What do clinical ethicists do, how and where do they do it, and what kind of clinical ethics is useful in the hospital and in other settings? (shrink)

We present a new partial order for directly forcing morasses to exist that enjoys a significant homogeneity property. We then use this forcing in a reverse Easton iteration to obtain an extension universe with morasses at every regular uncountable cardinal, while preserving all n-superstrong , hyperstrong and 1-extendible cardinals. In the latter case, a preliminary forcing to make the GCH hold is required. Our forcing yields morasses that satisfy an extra property related to the homogeneity of the partial order; we (...) refer to them as mangroves and prove that their existence is equivalent to the existence of morasses. Finally, we exhibit a partial order that forces universal morasses to exist at every regular uncountable cardinal, and use this to show that universal morasses are consistent with n-superstrong, hyperstrong, and 1-extendible cardinals. This all contributes to the second author’s outer model programme, the aim of which is to show that L-like principles can hold in outer models which nevertheless contain large cardinals. (shrink)

Lonergan's account of human consciousness as polymorphic self-presence differs significantly from both the variety of contemporary reductionistic accounts and phenomenological treatments still influenced strongly by Cartesian suppositions and/or Kantian restrictions. It is argued that Lonergan's account grounds not only a critical meta-philosophy, but also provides a heuristic structure for a nuanced genetic account of philosophic differences. In this regard, Lonergan's account is claimed to be an adequate grounding for a thorough contemporary response to the Hegelian requirement that philosophers account not (...) only for their own views but for the existence of contrary and differing philosophic convictions. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 3, March 2020, Page 83-85.

This article discusses the relationship of history, theology and mythmaking with reference to the myths of Glastonbury. These related to the legends associated with Joseph of Arimathea’ purported visit to England, the burial place of King Arthur, as well as the quest for the Holy Grail. It draws on the work of Joseph Armitage Robinson, one of the most important Biblical and patristic scholars of his generation who, after becoming Dean of Westminster and later Dean of Wells Cathedral in Somerset, (...) and close to Glastonbury, became a distinguished medievalist. After assessing the development of the Glastonbury legends and the use of early British history made in the earlier Anglican tradition, particularly in the work of Archbishop Matthew Parker, it goes on to discuss their revival in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries especially under the local parish priest Lionel Smithett Lewis. It concludes by showing that while there might be no historical substance in the myths, that there is nevertheless an important history to devotion and piety which is as equally open to theological and historical investigation as the events of history. (shrink)

This paper discusses theological responses in the Church of England to the South African War as reflected in sermons by theologians and church leaders and the limited amount of theological writing on the subject during the period. Three points emerge: first is the strong sense in which the mission was to civilise and Christianize. The fact that the war was being fought against a white enemy led to a characterisation of the Boer as uncivilised and primitive. Secondly, the British Empire (...) was not understood simply as a means of promoting the British interest across the world. Instead it was regarded as at least potentially a Christian Empire which embodied higher universal values. The emphasis was on humility and judgement, whereby moral absolutes were relativised by the vision of a more universal goal. This undoubtedly helped lessen the strength of some of the imperialist rhetoric. Finally, the higher values of self-sacrifice created a sense of moral seriousness: the universal values displayed in love for the community were prioritized over those of a narrow patriotism or individualism. Like the early days of the First World War, the Boer War functioned as an “antidote to anomie”. All in all, the strong dose of Platonism injected into Anglicanism in the nineteenth century meant that it functioned as a modest check on unfettered jingoism. A limited degree of prophetic critique – albeit deeply ambiguous, compromised and sometimes racist – remained the dominant theological discourse of Anglicanism, even at the highest point of imperialism. (shrink)

Ever since the publication of MacIntyre's After Virtue, the ‘Enlightenment Project’, where morality was uprooted from its traditional context and where human reason reigned supreme, has been regarded as doomed to failure. This view has been shared by a large number of theologians, but it is based on a misrepresentation of the Enlightenment, one strand of which sought to set limits to human reason. In particular, Immanuel Kant, who is discussed in detail, believed in the principle of perpetual criticism, a (...) method which refused to see human reason as supreme, but which also criticised all other systems of absolute authority. A trust in criticism was part and parcel of ‘growing‐up’: the educational process was thus of crucial importance as children gradually learnt to think for themselves. For Kant, this method was rooted in a theological position, where transcendence or ‘holiness’ functioned as a constant reminder of human finitude, and served to prevent all forms of idolatry. The article concludes with an outline of a theology suitable for grown‐ups, more aware of ideology and power than was Kant, where all truth is seen as relative to an absolute truth, but one which can never be known in full. Such a position, which is seen as profoundly Christological, encourages tolerance and openness, but makes a stand against those who claim a certainty or an authority they can never possess. The church is seen as that body which lives away from human certainties in a life of hope. (shrink)

For more than 20 years, both here and abroad, significant efforts have been undertaken to provide equal access to nutritional food for all citizens. Yet, the numbers of under-nourished continue to rise, as do those afflicted with non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as obesity, diabetes, hypertension, and heart disease. Clearly, current efforts are not working. Relying on the psychological phenomena of learned helplessness and fundamental attribution error, it is argued that certain individuals may not be willing, or able, to take actions (...) that are currently prescribed regarding access to nutritious food. The water is muddied regarding potential solutions as the various actors involved (e.g., corporations, governments, individuals) cannot agree on a starting point and continue to point fingers regarding responsibility. It is posited that emphasis needs to shift from the current “one-size-fits-all” approach to one that is more tailored to the various actors, specifically the individuals. Within the group of individuals (consumers), based on Wenar’s Least Cost Theory, even further distinction must be made between those who see themselves as capable actors and those who do not. In this conceptual piece intended to refocus the discussion surrounding food access, we propose that future research should approach these issues from a unit of analysis perspective in an attempt to identify the solutions most likely to succeed at various participating levels. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 31-32.

Lonergan is commonly read, sometimes favorably and sometimes unfavorably, through a Thomist lens. But the evidence suggests that Lonergan was interested in Hegel before he undertook his studies of Aquinas and that his interest in Hegel persisted throughout his intellectual career. Lonergan regarded Hegel’s absolute idealism as “the halfway house” on the way to his own critical realist position. His effort to establish his critical realism was informed and guided by a struggle with Hegel’s absolute idealist response to Kant’s Critical (...) Philosophy. Lonergan scholars who hope to understand adequately Lonergan’s critical realist position would do well to give more serious attention to his early and perduring relationship to Hegel. (shrink)

American orthodox medicine consolidated its professional authority in the early 20th Century on the basis of its unbiased scientific method. The centerpiece of such a method is a strategy for identifying truly effective new therapies, i.e., the randomized clinical trial (RCT). A crucial component of the RCT in illnesses without established treatment is the placebo control. Placebo effects must be identified and distinguished from pharmacological effects because placebos produce actual but unexplained therapeutic successes. The blinding necessary for a proper placebo-controlled (...) RCT therefore introduces an epistemic bias into orthodox medicine: therapeutic successes that rely upon a direct link between knowing and healing, such as placebo effects, are discarded in favor of therapeutic successes that rely upon an indirect link between knowing and healing, such as pharmacological interventions. Where the capacity to produce therapeutic results once validated the method of clinical medical science, now method validates results. The clinical consequences of this method of testing therapies include a diminished vision of the therapeutic potential of the doctor-patient relationship and of the potential human resources available for healing. Keywords: doctor-patient relationship, epistemology, placebo effect, professionalization, randomized clinical trials CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In “A Modest Proposal: Accounting for the Virtuousness of Modesty,” Irene McMullin characterizes the modest person as striking a delicate balance between accurate self-assessment and sensitivity to the feelings of others. She criticizes ‘egalitarian’ understandings of this process as unrealistically demanding, and instead proposes an account based on Sartrean facticity and self-awareness. In this brief comment, I defend the egalitarian accounts, arguing for a specifically Kantian explanation of modesty that combines the best of both the egalitarian and Sartrean views, and (...) is based on basic Kantian concepts of dignity and autonomy. On this account, the modest person honestly assesses her own successes according to her autonomously determined standards, yet exhibits modesty to others out of the recognition of the equal worth and dignity of all persons. (shrink)